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Recent years have seen a re-militarisation around the world, with the mili-
tary making a comeback on the political scene, especially in Latin America. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, though, the trend seems different: Before 1990, Af-
rica was the region with most military coups, and many countries on the 
continent were ruled by military regimes. Since 1990, however, the military 
has been steadily returning to the barracks. Despite this, the armed forces 
still matter in politics and remain a force to be reckoned with.
 • More visible forms of military intervention in politics have decreased over the 
last few decades. Openly military regimes have virtually vanished. Military 
coups still occur, but their frequency is declining. 
 • However, less visible forms of intervention by the military in politics persist. 
In almost 40 per cent of sub-Saharan cases, the military remains a powerful 
actor in politics; in 15 out of 49 countries, “generals in suits” rule as heads of 
government.
 • Causes of military involvement in politics include dissatisfaction with civilian 
governments and specific grievances and ambitions of officers. The diminished 
role of the military follows general trends of political opening after the end of the 
Cold War in Africa but can be also ascribed to both policies followed by regional 
organisations and a rejection of military rule by the respective populations. 
 • Effects of politicised militaries are ambiguous and depend on context – particu-
larly on regime type. Disloyal militaries threaten democracies but “democratis-
ing soldiers” can also contribute to the downfall of autocrats. Loyalty stabilises 
democracies, but in several cases the security forces are the main support for 
repressive autocrats.
Policy Implications
Politicised militaries often get involved when countries face political and socio-
economic problems. The most promising way to reduce politicisation is through 
professional security forces. Professionalism refers to staying out of politics, 
which facilitates an improved ability to tackle security risks such as terrorism 
and insurgencies without resorting to excessive force. Solutions must grow in 
Africa, but outside actors can support professionalism by assisting security sec-
tor reform. 
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On the Retreat: Military Regimes, Coups, and Presidents
Recently, countries around the world have become re-militarised, with the arm-
ed forces and other security actors re-emerging in political spheres, particularly 
in Latin America (Kurtenbach and Scharpf 2018; Scharpf 2020). In sub-Saharan 
Africa, [1] the overall picture and trend are different: Africa used to be the world re-
gion with the most military coups and military regimes (see Basedau 2008; Powell 
and Thyne 2010). But in the last 30 years, the military has slowly but steadily been 
returning to the barracks. Yet, the armed forces have never fully ceased to matter in 
politics and remain a force to be reckoned with in many countries. 
The most visible forms of military intervention in politics are military coups 
and military regimes. Both have decreased over the last few decades. Openly mili-
tary regimes have virtually ceased to exist. Presently, there are almost no political 
regimes in which the military directly rules without formal legitimisation by elec-
tions. An exception is Eritrea, which has not held any elections since its indepen-
dence from Ethiopia and where the single-party-turned-rebel-movement holds a 
tight grip on the country. Other regimes are described as civilised military regimes 
(see Basedau and Elischer 2013), especially Chad. The regimes are formally civilian, 
but the effective power still is with the military. Countries such as Burkina Faso, 
Guinea, and The Gambia, which counted as civilised military regimes around a dec-
ade ago, are now ruled by civilians. In Rwanda and Uganda, former rebel leaders 
came to power by the sword and have remained in power since the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, respectively. 
Military coups still occur on a rather regular basis, and this forms an exception 
worldwide, but their number is steadily in decline. Figure 1 shows the number of 
military coups per decade, starting in 1960. Military coups are defined as unconsti-
tutional takeovers by the military or other state security actors. It is not always easy 
to distinguish coups from coup attempts but usually more than one week of holding 
power is required to speak of a coup and not just an attempt (see e.g. Powell and 
Thyne 2010; Elischer 2017). Sometimes scholars also count takeovers by civilians 
as coups, though these are clearly not military coups. Likewise, when the military 
withdraws support to a president in trouble such as in Burkina Faso in 2014, which 
led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, we are not dealing with a military coup either. 
1 We use the term 
“sub-Saharan Africa” and 
“Africa” – leaving out five 
states in North Africa – 
interchangeably in this 
GIGA Focus.
Figure 1  
Military Coups in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
1960–2019
Source: Basedau and 
Elischer 2013, sup-
plemented by author 
and Sarah Wenzel for 
2010–2019.
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Such an example, however, shows the important political role of the military in times 
of crisis or so-called endgames (Kuehn, Eschenauer-Engler and Croissant 2019). 
However, since 2010 up to six military coup d’états occurred in sub-Saharan 
Africa, making it the world region with the most frequent coups: The military over-
threw governments in Niger in 2010, in Guinea-Bissau and Mali in 2012, and in 
Sudan in 2019. The other two instances are more contested as to whether or to 
what extent military coups occurred. In Burkina Faso in 2017, members of the pre-
sidential guard of former president Compaoré arrested the interim president and 
cabinet ministers, but civilian rule was restored by loyal armed forces only one week 
later. In 2017 ageing dinosaur Robert Mugabe was overthrown by members of the 
security apparatus led by Major General Constantino Chiwenga. However, the new 
interim government and parts of the international community refrained from cal-
ling the event a “coup.” Such a label has consequences for development cooperation 
and membership in the African Union. In sum, the numbers show a steadily decre-
asing number of military coups in sub-Saharan Africa, although the curve may have 
flattened in the last decade before 2020. It still represents an all-time low and is 
substantially less compared to most of the decades since independence, especially 
before the end of the Cold War, when there were over 20 coups per decade.
Another, related indicator of military influence is when top executive officials 
have a professional military background (see Figure 1; Basedau 2008). It makes 
sense to also account for former rebel leaders in this regard as they have been active 
military men, albeit not in the regular forces. Some African presidents satisfy both 
criteria. Chadian president Idriss Déby was chief of staff before he turned insurgent 
and took power at the apex of a rebellion in 1990. The same holds true for former 
chief of staff François Bozizé, who came to power in the Central African Republic 
(CAR) in 2003 – he was ousted in 2013 when rebels stormed the capital. As of early 
2020, according to our count (see Figure 1), in almost one-third of all countries (i.e. 
15 = 30.6 per cent), former military officers or rebel leaders were leading the exe-
cutive. In another six countries, including eSwatini (formerly known as Swaziland) 
and Tanzania, we found that heads of states had undergone military training, for 
instance as conscripts, but were never professional senior members of the security 
apparatus. The case of Djibouti poses a special problem: President Ismaïl Omar 
Guelleh once served as a police officer and later as head of the country’s intelligence 
service. He thus was part of the security sector, but not the military itself. All in all, 
more than two-thirds of states do not have any kind of “generals in suits” as presi-
dents or other heads of the executive. 
As for the number of military coups, the number of “military presidents” has 
decreased over time. Compared to an assessment in late 2008 (see Basedau 2008), 
the number went down from 19 countries to 15 as stated above. In no less than 13 
countries, the presidents have changed. In countries such as Burkina Faso, CAR, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), The Gambia, Guinea, Niger, and Su-
dan autocratic military men lost power, either through coups or in elections. In 
Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania, two former generals were elected president while 
retaining military leadership. South Sudan became independent in 2011 and has 
since been ruled by former rebel leaders. Emmerson Mnangagwa in Zimbabwe, a 
former intelligence officer, was enthroned after the fall of Robert Mugabe in 2017 
and held controversial elections in 2018. In seven countries where civilians had 
previously ruled, former military officers became heads of state between 2008 and 
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2019; most came to power through the ballot box. Examples of rather free elections 
include those of Muhammadu Buhari in Nigeria and Julius Maada Bio in Sierra 
Leone. Power transfers were also regular for João Lourenço in Angola and Aza-
li Assoumani in the Comoros. In only six countries have presidents with military 
backgrounds “survived” since 2008 – notably in Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, and Uganda. It is probably no coincidence that almost 
all of these countries are currently considered highly undemocratic.
Less Visible Influences: The Military as a Veto Actor 
However, less visible forms of military intervention in politics are more relevant 
than military coups and former generals as presidents – and they persist in African 
politics. Coups are a rather exceptional form of intervention and they indicate that 
other efforts to influence politics have apparently failed. Such influence is of course 
difficult to assess as it frequently occurs behind the scenes. In this case, qualitative 
expert assessments can help. For instance, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
(BTI) has an indicator on whether the (civilian, elected) government is actually able 
to govern and whether or to what extent non-elected actors can veto government 
policies. Such veto actors can be religious actors or business communities, but the 
armed forces or other actors from within the security apparatus can play that role 
as well. When looking at the most recent round of assessments (BTI 2020 [2]), we 
find that in no fewer than 20 countries (= almost 40 per cent) the military remains 
a powerful veto actor (see also Croissant, Eschenauer and Kamerling 2016). Ex-
amples include notorious cases such as Chad, Burundi, Mauritania, and Nigeria. 
However, the military can also play a role behind the scenes without being openly 
visible. Tanzania is a case in point, where the military does not appear in public but 
commands an important influence nevertheless. Also, in the DRC “the true power of 
government seems to rest on the sole control of the army” (BTI 2020), which other 
indicators do not make apparent. Former DRC president Joseph Kabila was forced 
to step down in 2019 – his party losing the subsequent presidential election – only 
to form a minority coalition in Parliament with new president Felix Thisekedi. 
Other cases are more difficult to assess, as reports do not mention the political 
role of the military in cases such as Angola, Mozambique, and South Sudan,  where 
former liberation movements have been in power since independence. It is not un-
likely, though, that the military is important – either as a separate actor or as an 
important part of the governments themselves. In The Gambia the role seems to be 
diminished since Yahya Jammeh, who had ruled the country since a 1994 coup, was 
forced out of power in 2016. 
While the almost 40 per cent of all sub-Saharan African countries represents a 
high number, we observe a downward trend. A number of reports explicitly mention 
that the military has become less politicised. This is even true for countries once 
notorious for coups and military regimes such as Benin and Ghana, in which politi-
cisation of the military now seems to be history. Yet, it also holds true for countries 
with recently still politically active military in cases such as Burkina Faso, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia, Niger, and Nigeria. Lately, the influence of the military 
has also decreased in Mali and Sudan. Especially in the latter two cases, it remains 
to be seen whether the return to the barracks will be final. A diminished role does 
2 The BTI includes 45 
out of 49 sub-Saharan 
countries. The remaining 
four small island states 
were assessed according 
to Human Rights Practices 
country reports by the US 
State Department (2018). 
These reports include a 
section on the security 
apparatus and whether it is 
under effective control.
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not mean that the armed forces are now completely apolitical. The trend is clear-
cut, though. Only Gabon, where young officers attempted a coup in 2019, seems to 
have witnessed a more political army recently. 
The matrix (Table 1) tentatively plots countries against the military background 
of the heads of the executive and the military’s veto power while also indicating 
whether coups took place in the last decade and whether the role of the military 
has increased or decreased according to expert assessments. The plot can be read 
from two angles that summarise the main message of this policy brief: The biggest 
group – comprising 23 countries – does not show any sign of military involvement 
in politics. In ten countries the military’s role seems to have tangibly diminished. 
However, the military can be classified as a veto actor in 20 countries, and at least 
15 cases evince “ruling generals.” Nine countries falling into both of the latter cate-
gories simultaneously further underscores the substantial influence of the military 
that remains.
Varied Causes and Ambiguous Effects of Politicised Militaries
The role of the military in politics should not be underestimated. The military pos-
sesses physical means of coercion – in short: weapons – and some scholars have 
argued that the military’s non-intervention in politics requires explanation, not its 
presence (e.g. Croissant and Kuehn 2011). Especially in times of crisis, the security 
Military is a veto actor
Yes No or unclear
President is a 
former military of-
ficer/rebel leader
Yes
Burundi
Chad
Guinea-Bissau ↓*
Mauritania 
Nigeria ↓ 
Rwanda 
Sierra Leone 
Sudan ↓*
Uganda 
Zimbabwe*
Comoros
Congo-Brazzaville
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea 
Unclear:
Angola
South Sudan
No
Burkina Faso ↓* 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
Gabon ↑ 
Guinea ↓ 
Mali ↓*
Niger ↓* 
Rwanda
São Tomé & Príncipe
Tanzania 
Togo 
Benin ↓
Botswana 
Cabo Verde 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic
Djibouti 
eSwatini 
Ethiopia 
Ghana ↓ 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Namibia
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Somalia
South Africa 
Zambia
Unclear:
The Gambia ↓ 
Mozambique
N 20: 9 vs 11 29: 6 vs 23
Table 1  
Military as a Veto 
Actor and Presidents 
with Military Back-
grounds (as of early 
2020) 
Source: Author’s 
compilation based 
on the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index 
(2020). For Cape Verde, 
Comoros, São Tomé & 
Príncipe, and Seychelles 
the assessment is based 
on reports by the US Sta-
te Department (see also 
Croissant, Eschenauer, 
and Kamerling 2016).
Note: Data on military 
backgrounds of presi-
dents compiled by Sarah 
Wenzel.
* Military coup in last 
decade, 2010–2019. 
“↓” or “↑” respectively 
indicates decrease or 
increase of politicisation 
of the military based on 
expert assessments (BTI) 
or other evidence (e.g. 
coup attempt in Gabon 
= “↑”).
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forces can and do make the difference. However, the effects of a political military 
on the ensuing regime type are ambiguous (see also Elischer 2017 and Table 1). 
Clearly, a disloyal security apparatus is a threat to democracy, and a loyal military 
contributes to a democratic political system. By contrast, a loyal military in an au-
thoritarian regime hinders democratisation, and security forces are those who exert 
repression in its most brutal form (Basedau and Elischer 2013; see also Kurtenbach 
and Scharpf 2018 on Latin America). 
In turn, disloyalty poses a risk for authoritarian regimes, too, opening a win-
dow of opportunity for democratisation. A case in point are the protests in Burkina 
Faso against the efforts by then president Compaoré to prolong his term in office. 
The arm ed forces did not intervene, which led to his downfall in 2014. In Niger, 
President Tandja Mamadou was even overthrown directly by the armed forces in 
2010, when he tried to unconstitutionally extend his time in office. There are other 
examples of the impact of “democratising soldiers,” such as in the fall of dominant 
and single-party systems in Mali (1991) and – at least indirectly – Guinea (2008). 
Generally, coups no longer result in openly military regimes and rarely simply lead 
to autocratic restoration. Successful coup plotters rush to announce elections, and 
unlike in previous decades these elections are actually held – although the out comes 
in terms of democratic quality substantially differ (Elischer 2017). Apparently, con-
textual conditions such as the absence of social tensions and an active civil society 
count (more). Zimbabwe provides a useful example: after Mugabe’s fall,  hopes for 
substantial democratisation have been disappointed thus far. In Sudan, the military 
has made efforts to maintain as much power as possible since the uprisings in 2019; 
despite the military sharing power with civilians at the time of writing, it remains to 
be seen who will eventually gain the upper hand.
Loyal, apolitical military Disloyal, politicised military
In authoritarian 
regime
Authoritarian stability and 
repression (e.g. Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea)
Instability and prospect of demo-
cratisation (Burkina Faso 2015) or 
authoritarian restoration/continuation 
(Zimbabwe 2017)
In democratic 
regime
Democratic stability (Botswa-
na, Ghana)
Instability and prospect of regression 
(Mali 2012) or restoration of democra-
cy (Niger 2011)
Causes for interventions by the military are varied. Open interventions by the 
military usually result from political and economic crisis and related dissatisfac-
tion with the civilian leadership (e.g. for Africa: Basedau 2008; globally: Crois-
sant and  Kuehn 2011). Sometimes, more narrow ambitions also stimulate coups. 
For instance, the coup in Mali in 2012 was borne out of mass dissatisfaction over 
poor equipment and lack of support in the fight against Tuareg and Islamist rebels. 
In other cases, the military mutinied because of bad pay and lack of career ad-
vancement opportunities (e.g. lately in Côte d’Ivoire). Correspondingly, enjoying 
privileged access to state funds can boost loyalty. In Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial 
Guinea, and Eritrea – also arguably in Angola – the military is a central beneficiary 
of state funds. Not being politicised and thus loyal is an apparently effective strategy 
to secure power in authoritarian (and democratic) countries. 
Table 2 
Ambivalent Effects 
of Military Loyalty 
According to Regime 
Type
Source: Author’s 
compilation.
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Poor or no pay – or diversion for private benefit on behalf of political or mili-
tary leaders – is directly connected to economic and political conditions for which 
sub-Saharan Africa has been notorious. If general conditions account for military 
interventions, a general upward trend in political and socio-economic conditions 
seems logically to also promote the return to the barracks. Such progress includes 
bigger middle classes and stronger civil societies as well as less erratic and bizar-
re leaders (see e.g. Basedau 2019; Carbone and Pellegata 2020). However, more 
specific reasons for military interventions come to mind. The international and re-
gional environment has changed. Regional organisations no longer accept uncons-
titutional takeovers and regularly suspend membership of respective countries. As 
a result, coupists are quick to announce elections and countries regularly return to 
constitutional rule, although outcomes do not always conform to high democratic 
standards, as discussed above. 
Democratic norms are also rather popular among the general population and 
may additionally explain the decreased influence of the military. According to the 
Afrobarometer (round 7), two thirds of Africans (= 68 per cent) in 34 surveyed 
countries prefer democracy to any other kind of rule, and an even bigger majority 
of 72 per cent reject military rule (Mattes 2019). This is not to say that Africans 
distrust the military in general. Compared to other institutions, especially political 
parties but also presidents and traditional rulers, the armed forces enjoy the highest 
level of trust among Africans (Afrobarometer 2019). Almost two thirds (63.9 per 
cent) have “some trust” or “high trust” in the army, compared to 45.1 and 54.6 per 
cent in the national assembly and the president, respectively. Interestingly, this 
also holds true for some countries with long-standing military rule and a history of 
military interventions. In Niger, for example, almost two thirds have “a lot of trust” 
in the armed forces. Political parties evince the least level of trust, on average only 
around 30 per cent.
The Dual Challenge of Professional Security Forces
Measures to counter military involvement in politics should directly correspond to 
its causes. As some of the causes of military interventions point to broader prob lems 
of political and socio-economic development, any measure that addresses  these 
root causes can also contribute to minimising the problem of politicised mili taries. 
If governments want to avoid coups, they should avoid institutional deadlocks, 
succession struggles, and rampant corruption. Governments should also strive 
to keep the economy going or get started in the first place and to make sure that 
wealth reaches the most needy and vulnerable parts of the population. Time will 
tell  whether the novel coronavirus will manifest in political and/or socio-economic 
fallout in Africa. It will also be very relevant to make sure that the military is well 
trained and well – and regularly – paid. This connects to the more specific challenge 
of professional security forces. Professionalism (Croissant and Kuehn 2011) refers 
to staying out of politics and developing a sense of loyalty. One obvious imperative 
is to institutionally increase effective control over the security sector. Yet, reforms 
may be risky in themselves and are often motivations to plot coups (Croissant and 
Kuehn 2011). 
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Winning over the minds of soldiers is at least as promising a strategy to profes-
sionalise the military. Though, of course, it is not easy to change the attitude of a 
politicised army, it is not impossible, as the diminished role of the military in coun-
tries such as Benin and Ghana exemplifies. International exchange programmes 
and military advice can help as well – although we should not overestimate their 
effect. These programmes have been in place for a long time and have not always 
had positive effects (e.g. Ansorg 2017). Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, who ousted 
Guinea’s government in 2008, had previously participated in a programme run by 
the German Federal Defence Forces in Hamburg. This was made obvious to the 
attentive observer by the captain’s sporting of a Bordeaux-colour beret, the same 
one worn by German paratroopers (Fallschirmjäger), that he kept on wearing even 
after the coup. His rule was one of the last examples of erratic military dictatorship 
and came to an end only when he was shot by fellow soldiers in 2009. Guinea then 
transitioned to civilian rule. However, generally, efforts to boost political loyalty 
and neutrality remain key to professionalism.
The other aspect of professionalism rarely receives any attention in debates on 
civilian–military relations. Security forces also must be capable of tackling security 
risks such as terrorism and insurgencies. Performing security operations also re-
quires not resorting to excessive use of force, which can be counterproductive. The 
crisis in the Sahel is also a crisis of underperforming security forces (e.g. Michailof 
2018). For instance, Malian armed forces could not match the well-equipped Tua-
reg and Islamist rebels in 2012 and successive years. Burkinabé forces have been 
struggling likewise recently. To acknowledge a more disturbing reality, underpay-
ing and poorly training security forces is sometimes done on purpose: presidents 
may fear the military and hence keep it weak in order to be “coup-proof” (Böhmelt 
and Pilster 2015; Croissant and Kühn 2011). Moreover, development aid program-
mes have often demanded that local governments cut military spending – leaving 
them incapable of fighting insurgencies (e.g. Michailof 2018). In the Sahel and other 
parts of Africa, international donors have reacted by starting several programmes 
for security sector reform (see Ansorg 2017). However, success has been mixed at 
best. It goes without saying that the challenge of professionalism must be tackled 
in Africa and by Africans. One should not expect miracles from short-term security 
sector reform programmes either. Solutions must be cultivated in Africa, but out-
side actors can support professionalism by strong collaboration in the reform of the 
security sector as part of long-term cooperation. In one way or the other, the armed 
forces and the security apparatus as a whole will remain a force to be reckoned with.
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